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MORTGAGES - NoTIcE - VENDOR AND PURCHASER - VENDOR NOT
CHARGED WiTH CONSTRUCTIVE NoTIcE OF SUBSEQUENT MORTGAGE OF
CONTRACT PuRcHASE'S EQUrrY - MORTGAGEE REQUIRED TO NoTiFY
VENDOR TO PROTECT SEcUTY INTEREST. - Kendrick v. Davis, 75
Wash. Dec. 2d 470, 452 P.2d 222 (1969).
Seller and purchaser executed and recorded an installment contract
for the sale of land which provided for forfeiture in the event of the
purchaser's default. For security purposes, the purchaser transferred
his interest in the contract and land to a mortgagee1 by means of a
recorded assignment of contract and deed. When the purchaser de-
faulted on the contract, the seller sent notice of intent to forfeit to the
purchaser but not to the mortgagee, recorded a declaration of forfeiture,
and brought an action to quiet title in himself.
The mortgagee appeared as a defendant in the seller's action, claim-
ing that his security interest in the land could not be extinguished
without notice to him by the seller. He contended that he, as well as
the purchaser, was entitled to notice of intent to forfeit and to an op-
portunity to cure the purchaser's default by making the delinquent
payments and assuming the purchaser's duties under the contract. The
seller argued that he need not give notice to the mortgagee because he
had no knowledge of the mortgagee's interest, the mortgagee having
failed to notify him. The mortgagee replied that lack of actual knowl-
edge did not excuse the seller from his duty to notify him and that, at
any rate, the seller had constructive notice of the security interest be-
cause the assignment of contract and deed had been recorded.
Held: The recording of an instrument creating a security interest
in a purchaser's equity under a land sale contract does not give con-
structive notice of the security interest to a person who acquired his
interest in the land by an instrument which was recorded prior to the
security instrument. The court explicitly overruled Norlin v. Mont-
1. The mortgagee contended that the transaction through which he acquired his
interest was not a mortgage and that he was merely an assignee, but the court rejected
that contention. Kendrick v. Davis, 75 Wash. Dec. 2d 470, 474, 452 P.2d 222, 225-226
(1969) ; cf. Middlesteadt v. Johnson, 75 Wash. 550, 553, 135 P. 214, 216 (1913). Conse-
quently, the mortgage created a lien on the property in favor of the mortgagee. Swanson
v. United States, 156 F.2d 442, 170 AL.R. 258 (9th Cir., 1946); Fleishbein v. Thorne,
193 Wash. 65, 74 P.2d 880 (1938).
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gomery2 to the extent that it is inconsistent with the instant case and
ruled that the burden is on the subsequent mortgagee to give notice of
his interest to the holder of an antecedent interest. Kendrick v. Davis,
75 Wash. Dec. 2d 470, 452 P.2d 222 (1969) (Hill and Rosellini, JJ.,
dissenting).
It is clear that in Washington a purchaser of land under an install-
ment contract may mortgage his equity in the property.3 Furthermore,
a number of cases prior to 1961 had held that the seller could not
declare forfeiture of an installment contract without giving the holder
of a security interest in the land notification of intent to forfeit and an
opportunity to fulfill the purchaser's obligations under the contract.
4
The effect of these decisions was to protect the holder of a security
interest against extinguishment of his interest by the default of a pur-
chaser over whom he had no control.'
Also prior to 1961, the Washington court had construed the state's
real property recording statutes.' Although some cases indicated that
the recording of an instrument was notice to all the world,' such state-
ments were inconsistent with the established rule in Washington that
2. 59 Wn. 2d 268, 367 P.2d 621 (1961), noted in 34 Rocxy MT. L. REV. 572 (1962).
The language in Kendrick which overrules Norlin is in 75 Wash. Dec. 2d at 479, 452
P.2d at 228. See text accompanying notes 19-21 infra.
3. Scott v. Farnam, 55 Wash. 336, 340, 104 P. 639, 640-641 (1909). There has been
conflict in the Washington cases for many years as to just what interest in the land
the purchaser does have, but this does not affect the proposition that an installment
purchaser may mortgage whatever interest he has. Compare First National Bank v.
Mapson, 181 Wash. 196, 42 P.2d 782 (1935) with Griffith v. Whittier, 37 Wn. 2d 351,
223 P.2d 1062 (1950).
4. Smith v. Northern Pac. Ry., 22 Wash. 500, 61 P. 255 (1900); Brummett v. Camp-
bell, 32 Wash. 358, 73 P. 403 (1903) ; Shaw v. Benesh, 37 Wash. 457, 79 P. 1007 (1905);
Scott v. Farnam, 55 Wash. 336, 104 P. 639 (1909). All cases here cited involved mort-
gagees except Shaw v. Benesh which involved an assignee of the vendor.
5. It is arguable that, because the mortgagee is neither a party to the contract nor
a third-party beneficiary, he should not be entitled to such notification. However, given
the determination that the purchaser had an interest which could be mortgaged, the
court in the cases cited in note 4, supra, apparently thought that mortgages of such
interests would be valueless unless the mortgagee were given some way to protect his
interest. The notification requirement was the logical protective device. The same result
has generally been reached in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Davis v. Milligan, 88 Ala.
523, 6 So. 908 (1889); Stannard v. Marboe, 159 Minn. 119, 198 N.W. 127 (1924); Alden
v. Garver, 32 Ewell 32 (Ill. 1863); Sinclair v. Armitage, 12 N.j. Eq. 174 (1858).
As noted by Judge Hill in his dissent in Kendrick, 75 Wash. Dec. 2d at 483-84, 452
P.2d at 231, once the mortgagee receives notice of the seller's intent to forfeit, he can-
not acquire the right to perform the contract in the purchaser's stead without a con-
veyance from the mortgagor or foreclosure of his mortgage interest.
6. WAsH. REV. CooE §§ 65.08.070, 65.08.080 (1958).
7. Strong v. Clark, 56 Wn. 2d 230, 232, 352 P.2d 183, 184 (1960) ; Allen v. Graaf, 179
Wash. 431, 439, 38 P.2d 236, 240 (1934).
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the recording of an instrument was notice only to those persons acquir-
ing interests in land subsequent to the filing and recording of the in-
strument, not to those whose interests antedated the recording 8
In 1961, in Norlin v. Montgomery,9 the court was first faced with
a fact pattern in which the policy of protecting mortgagees conflicted
with previous interpretations of the effects of recording. The dispute
was between an installment contract seller and a subsequent mortgagee
of the purchaser's rights, as in Kendrick. Both instruments had been
recorded, and the notice of intent to forfeit had been sent to the pur-
chaser but not to his mortgagee, again as in Kendrick. Unlike Kendrick,
however, in Norlin the seller accepted from the purchaser a deed which
quitclaimed the purchaser's interest in the contract before forfeiture
had been declared and before expiration of the time allowed to cure
the default.10 The Norlin court held that the seller had constructive
notice of the mortgage at the time the contract was cancelled by the
quitclaim deed, and therefore the quitclaim of the purchaser's interest
was subject to the mortgagee's security interest. The court said,"
[Mortgagee's] mortgage was recorded at the time the [vendor]
accepted the quit claim deed, and [vendor] had constructive
notice of the encumbrance which [the purchaser] had placed upon
his equity in the property.... [Vendor] and [purchaser], because
of [mortgagee's] mortgage, could not cancel the contract without
a release from [mortgagee].
One possible interpretation of this statement is that when the seller
accepted the quitclaim deed from the purchaser, she became, in effect,
a "subsequent purchaser"'12 and was thus charged with constructive
notice of the recorded mortgage. Consequently, the seller was required
to notify the mortgagee of her intent to cancel the contract and allow
him an opportunity to cure the purchaser's default.
By contrast, in Kendrick, the court rejected the mortgagee's con-
8. Finley v. Finley, 43 Wn. 2d 755, 764, 264 P.2d 246, 252 (1953); Waldrip v. Olym-
pia Oyster Co., 40 Wn. 2d 469, 476, 244 P.2d 273, 278 (1952) ; Ryan v. Plath, 18 Wn. 2d
839, 863, 140 P.2d 968, 980 (1943); Ackerson v. Elliott, 97 Wash. 31, 41, 165 P. 899,
903 (1917).
9. 59 Wn. 2d 268, 367 P.2d 621 (1961).
10. Brief for Respondent, at 2-4, Norlin v. Montgomery, 59 Wn. 2d 268, 367 P.2d 621
(1961).
11. 59 Wn. 2d 268, 273, 367 P.2d 621, 624 (1961).
12. See cases cited in and text accompanying note 8 supra.
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tention that it would be inequitable to extinguish his security interest
without his being given the opportunity to cure the purchaser's default,
and reasoned that as to subsequent mortgagees of whom the seller had
no actual notice, the seller had no burden of notification. 13 To place
such a burden on the seller, the court concluded, would force him to
make an additional title search before declaring a contract forfeiture,
in order to discover such subsequent interests.14 The subsequent mort-
gagee, already charged with knowledge of the seller's prior recorded
interest, would incur no additional burden of discovery or search be-
cause of a duty to notify the seller of his interest. Consequently, the
court decided that the mortgagee, rather than the seller, should bear
the burden of notification because that burden would be less an incon-
venience to the mortgagee than to the seller.' 5
Inconveniences balanced, the Kendrick court reviewed prior cases
to see if its view was contrary to earlier statements protecting mort-
gagees' interests or to doctrines concerning constructive notice by
virtue of recorded instruments. It found, first, that its determination
that the seller was not charged with constructive notice of interests
recorded subsequent to his own was in accord with earlier decisions
holding that the recording of an instrument did not constitute notice
to holders of antecedent interests in the chain of title. 6 Turning to the
decisions which protected the security interests of mortgagees in the
purchaser's equity, the court found that, despite statements of general
intent to protect such interests, almost all of these cases had involved
situations in which the party holding the seller's interest either had
received actual notice of the mortgagee's interest, or was a person
whose interest in the property was created subsequent to the recorded
mortgage, so that constructive notice was given.'T The court distin-
guished these cases, preserving the mortgagee's right to notification
where the seller has actual notice of the security interest or acquires
his interest subsequent to the recording of the security instrument. But,
under the Kendrick facts, where the seller was an antecedent party in
13. 75 Wash. Dec. 2d 470, 476-77, 452 P.2d 222, 227 (1969).
14. Id. at 477, 452 P.2d at 227-28.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 478, 452 P.2d at 228; see cases cited in and text accompanying note 8 supra.
17. 75 Wash. Dec. 2d 470, 478-79, 452 P.2d 222, 228 (1969); see cases cited in and
text accompanying note 4 supra.
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the chain with no actual notice of the mortgage, the court imposed on
the mortgagee the burden of notifying the seller of his interest before
becoming entitled to notice from the seller of intent to forfeit. 8
The Kendrick court apparently interpreted Norlin v. Montgomery9
as placing the burden of notifying a mortgagee of intent to cancel the
contract on a seller antecedent in the chain of title with no actual
knowledge of the recorded mortgage. It stated that Norlin was "the
single exception ' 2 to the cases distinguished. As a result, Norlin was
overruled "to the extent it is inconsistent ' 21 with Kendrick.
A restrictive analysis can reconcile Norlin and Kendrick. If the
seller who seeks to extinguish the purchaser's interest by taking a
quitclaim deed is regarded as the equivalent of a subsequent purchaser,
then under recording statute doctrine he has constructive notice of all
prior interests, including that of the purchaser's mortgagee, and there-
fore is obliged to notify the mortgagee of his intent to cancel the con-
tract. By contrast, if the seller, instead of accepting a quitclaim deed,
institutes forfeiture proceedings, he is not regarded as a subsequent
purchaser and therefore, again under recording statute doctrine, he
has no constructive notice of the subsequent interest of the mortgagee
18. 75 Wash. Dec. 2d 470, 479, 452 P.2d 222, 228 (1969). The court in Kendrick did
not discuss, and apparently not consider, cases from other jurisdictions. Only a few cases
have dealt with the problems here presented. Usually, the reported seller-mortgagee
conflicts have involved actual notice by the seller, or the existence of a subsequent
holder of the seller's interest, and have resulted in the decision that the seller should have
notified the mortgagee. See, e.g., Alden v. Garver, 32 Ewell 32 (Ill. 1863); Williams v.
Corey, 21 N.D. 509, 131 N.W. 457 (1911). The result is in accord with the earlier
Washington cases. See cases cited in and text accompanying note 4 supra.
The few cases involving a situation in which the seller, an antecedent party, had no
actual notice are in conflict, and none is useful to a consideration of the issues involved
in Kendrick. Miles Homes, Inc. of Iowa v. Grant, 257 Iowa 697, 134 N.W.2d 569 (1965)
(result in accord with Kendrick) and Stannard v. Marboe, 159 Minn. 119, 198 N.W.
127 (1924) (result contrary to Kendrick) were based on statutes which have no equiv-
alent in Washington. First Mortgage Corp. of Stuart v. deGive, 177 So. 2d 741 (Fla.
App. 1965) (result contrary to Kendrick), the only other case involving the precise
problem of Kendrick, relied on 59 CJ.S. Mortgages, § 184, at 746 (1949), which states:
A mortgage given by one holding land under an executory contract for its pur-
chase covers his interest . . . and the mortgagee cannot be ousted of his rights by
a rescission of the contract of sale by the original parties to it.
However, an examination of the authorities cited by CJ.S. reveals that the only cases
cited which involved antecedent parties wth no actual notice are Stannard v. Marboe,
supra, and Norlin v. Montgomery, 59 Wn. 2d 268, 367 P.2d 621 (1961). It is thus ap-
parent that the cited authority gives dubious support to the rule expressed.
19. 59 Wn. 2d 268, 367 P.2d 621 (1961).
20. 75 Wash. Dec. 2d 470, 478, 452 P.2d 222, 228 (1969).
21. Id. at 479, 452 P.2d at 228.
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and is thus under no obligation to notify the latter of his intent to
forfeit.22
But, the Kendrick court properly concluded that its decision neces-
sitated the overruling of Norlin. To view the cases as consistent would
be to ignore substance and favor form. In each case the seller was
concerned with extinguishing the purchaser's interest because of a
default. A doctrinal distinction which makes the seller's efforts to
retrieve full title in himself subject to a mortgage if he accepts a deed
but allows him to ignore the mortgage if he declares a forfeiture and
brings a quiet title action runs counter to the normal and salutary
inclination of men to settle their differences amicably by executing a
deed in order to avoid litigation. Furthermore, the seller's purpose in
declaring a forfeiture and bringing a quiet title action 23 is, in sub-
stance, the same as his purpose in accepting a quitclaim deed and
recording it-to have on record a document which confirms full title
in him. Under either approach, the seller's goal is to affect the record
title.24
There is an additional practical argument for treating Norlin and
Kendrick as conflicting. If they were construed as consistent, the
burden of notifying the mortgagee of efforts to extinguish the mortgage
interest would fall on the seller when he accepts a deed but not when
he declares a forfeiture. The burden of notifying the seller of the
22. Under the facts of both Norlin and Kendrick, it can be argued that the contract
was cancelled and that it is cancellation, rather than a subsequent attempt by the
seller to retrieve record title, which extinguishes the mortgagee's interest. Applying this
argument to Kendrick, the contract was forfeited by expiration of the time allowed to
cure the default extinguishing the mortgagee's interest when that time elapsed. No duty
to notify the mortgagee arose on the seller's subsequent attempt to quiet title because
then the mortgagee no longer had any interest. Conversely in Norlin, the very deed by
which the cancellation was effected served simultaneously as the seller's attempt to
affect the record. Since the instrument designed to cancel the contract was also used to
affect the record, it is not unreasonable to make the extinguishment of the mortgagee's
interest depend on constructive notice of what the record contained when the deed was
filed. On the basis of this argument, Norlin and Kendrick can be viewed as consistent.
23. Vendor brings his quiet title action in order to get a judgment showing that he
has full title, which judgment is then recorded in accordance with WAsH. REV. CODE
§ 65.04.070 (1958).
24. The court overruled the Norlin decision as inconsistent with that in Kendrick on
the apparent ground that the cancellation of the contract in each case extinguished the
mortgagee's interest before the seller took any action which would charge him with
constructive notice. As shown above, however (note 22 supra), this rationale is inap-
plicable to the Norlin fact pattern, and the cases might, on this basis, have been found
distinguishable. The argument in this section of the text, however, is that there are
more substantial and more practical grounds for viewing the two decisions as conflicting.
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mortgagee's interest would fall on the mortgageee in cases involving
forfeiture actions but not in those involving a purchaser's quitclaim.
There would be no way for anyone to know who has to notify whom
of what under such a state of law until the seller decided to cancel the
contract and elected to use one method or the other. For the mortgagee,
this would mean that his notification duties would never be fixed legally
until it is too late for him to cure a failure to notify.
It is evident then that the notification duties of both the seller and
the mortgagee should not depend on the method the seller selects to
terminate interests other than his own. It remains for this casenote to
consider whether the Kendrick decision was correct in requiring the
mortgagee of a recorded purchaser's equity interest to notify the
seller of his interest before becoming entitled to notice from the seller
of the latter's intent to forfeit or cancel the real estate contract.
The approach of the Kendrick court was to apply recording statute
doctrine before reaching the equities presented by the mortgagee.25
The court concluded that the seller was not charged with notice of the
subsequent recorded mortgage because he was antecedent in the chain
of title.28 This ruling was undoubtedly a doctrinally correct application
of earlier decisions concerning notice to antecedent parties.2 7 However,
several considerations suggest that the court should not have permitted
adherence to precedent to preclude a rigorous examination of the
equities of the mortgagee's position.
The recording statutes themselves do not state that recording of an
instrument is notice only to subsequent parties.2 8 The statute applicable
to Kendrick provides only that when there is a failure to record, a
subsequent purchaser without actual knowledge who records first will
not have constructive notice 29 The ruling that antecedent parties will
not have constructive notice is a product of judicial interpretation3 0
25. Kendrick, 75 Wash. Dec. 2d 470, 476, 452 P.2d 222, 227 (1969).
26. Id. at 477, 452 P.2d at 228.
27. See cases cited in note 8 supra. Judge Hill's dissent also calls the majority ruling
"academically correct." 75 Wash. Dec. 2d at 480, 452 P.2d at 229. The Kendrick court
applied the "no constructive notice" rule to decide that, because the seller had no notice,
the mortgagee's interest was extinguished. The court thus refused to reach the mort-
gagee's equitable argument. See notes 13-18 and accompanying text supra.
28. WASH. REV. CO E §§ 65.08.070, 65.08.080 (1958).
29. WASH. R v. CODE § 65.08.070. This statute applies to the recording of a mort-
gagee's interest.
30. See cases cited in note 8 supra.
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Such an interpretation has no connection with the two basic purposes
of recording acts: 1) to penalize those who fail to record and 2) to
protect those who record subsequent to such failure.3' Rather, it ap-
parently stems from a practical judicial recognition of customary
methods of title search and use of records. A purchaser will have a
search conducted to determine that the title he is about to take is clear,
but after he records his acquisition instrument, he usually will not
look at the record again. Realizing this, courts have decided that he
will be charged with notice only of what the record contains at the
moment the instrument is recorded and not with notice of what is
recorded subsequently.32 The courts reason that the purchaser conducts
the title search with the intent of changing the record and thus should
be charged with notice only of what the record contains at the moment
he changes it.
By the same reasoning, in situations such as those presented in
Norlin and Kendrick, where the seller's purpose is to change the record
so that it will reflect full title in him,33 he should be charged with what
is in the record at the moment he attempts to effect the change. It
should be immaterial that he already has an interest in the land. He is
not antecedent in the chain of title as to the event he is attempting to
record. He should thus be charged with notice of those interests ap-
pearing in the record, such as mortgages, at the time that he records.
Such a requirement would not be opposed to the basic purposes of the
recording acts.34 However, the construction of the recording statutes
adopted in Kendrick is contrary to the underlying rationale for the
rule that antecedent parties do not have constructive notice of in-
struments which are subsequently recorded. That is to say, a real estate
contract vendor who attempts to change the record to reflect full title
in himself is not an antecedent party as to that event, but more
properly deemed a subsequent purchaser. The result of Kendrick was
compelled neither by the purposes of the recording acts nor by judicial
interpretation of their application to antecedent parties.
Because the rule that an antecedent party is not charged with notice
31, Johnson, Purpose and Scope of Recording Statutes, 47 IowA L. REV. 231 (1962).
32. See cases cited in note 8 supra.
33. See notes 23-24 and accompanying text supra.
34. See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
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is a judicial construct, the manner of application of that rule is within
judicial power. Because the Kendrick holding is based on grounds of
practicality, a modified application of the "no notice to antecedents"
doctrine which better conforms to the practical realities of the situation
would have been warranted. Such modification would not entail a rule
that some antecedent parties are charged with constructive notice
while others are not. A court would be justified in declaring that, when-
ever a contract seller seeks to cancel a contract, by whatever means,
he becomes for the purposes of recording a subsequent purchaser. He
is, in effect, repurchasing the equity of his purchaser.36 As the seeker
of a subsequent interest, the seller should be charged with notice of a
recorded mortgage on the purchaser's interest, and be required to give
notification to the mortgagee or to take subject to the mortgage.3 7
Moreover, the recording statute doctrine applied by the Kendrick
court improperly cuts off consideration of the mortgagee's equities.38
The recording acts were not intended as a substitute for equitable
justice. It is true, as the court observed in Kendrick,39 that the mort-
gagee, by searching the records before executing the mortgage, has
notice of the seller's interest. Nevertheless, a strong argument for
relieving the mortgagee of the burden of notifying the seller of his
interest is presented by the equities of such cases.4 °
35. See cases cited in note 8 supra.
36. Although neither the purchaser nor-the mortgagee has an estate in the land, it is
clear that both take interests in the land. Griffith v. Whittier, 37 Wn. 2d 351, 23 P.2d
1062 (1950); Fleishbein v. Thorne, 193 Wash. 65, 74 P.2d 880 (1938); Scott v. Farnam,
55 Wash. 336, 104 P. 639 (1909). It is also clear that those interests are recordable.
WAsH. REV. CODE §§ 65.08.070, 65.08.080 (1958). If these parties both possess valid and
recordable interests, of whatever nature, the seller can no longer possess those interests;
therefore, in cancelling the contract, he is not merely retaining what was his all the
time, but retrieving an interest which he had alienated. Thus, he may be charged with
notice of the mortgagee's interest if it is recordable and recorded.
37. The same result could be reached by legislative action. In Standard v. Marboe,
159 Mlinn. 119, 198 N.W. 127 (1924), the court held that the mortgagee on vendee's
interest was an "assign" of the contract, and entitled to notification of the impending
cancellation under a Minnesota statute requiring that such notice be given to assigns.
At present, Washington has no such statute.
38. Indeed, it is questionable whether anyone's equities should ever be destroyed by
any construction or application of the recording acts, in view of the serious attacks on
these statutes. See, e.g., Cross, Weaknesses of the Present Recording System, 47 IowA L.
REv. 245 (1962); Cross, The Record "Chain of Title" Hypocrisy, 57 CoLunx. L. REv.
787 (1957); MacDougal and Brabner-Smith, Land Title Transfer: A Regression, 48
YA E L.J. 1125 (1939); Rood, Registration of Land Titles, 12 MicH. L. REv. 379 (1914).
39. 75 Wash. Dec. 2d 470, 477, 452 P.2d 222, 227.
40. See Brief for Respondent, at 9-11, Kendrick v. Davis, 75 Wash. Dec. 2d 470, 452
P.2d 222 (1969). This argument is developed in text accompanying notes 41-44 infra.
653
Washington Law Review
Under the facts of both Norlin and Kendrick, if the burden of
notifying the seller of the mortgagee's interest is placed on the mort-
gagee and he fails in his obligation, the seller has the right to extinguish
the mortgagee's security interest in toto, without compensation and
without notification. On the other hand, if the burden is placed on the
seller to notify the mortgagee of an intent to terminate interests other
than the seller's, regardless of whether the mortgagee has notified the
seller of his mortgage interest, and the seller fails in his obligation,
the mortgagee has no immediate right to possession of the property,
nor can he divest the seller of his interest without compensation. 4 At
most, the mortgagee gains the right to reinstate the contract and fore-
close his mortgage under statutory procedures. 42 If the mortgagee is
unable or unwilling to fulfill the contract obligations, the seller could
still regain the property free of encumbrances.43 Even if the mortgagee
assumes the purchaser's obligations, the seller will still receive the
price he bargained for under the contract. It would be far more
equitable to place a burden of notification on the party who seeks to
extinguish the rights of another completely, than to penalize for failure
to give notice one who seeks only the opportunity to perform obliga-
tions under the contract.44
Another reason for placing a burden of notification on the seller,
whether or not the mortgagee has informed him of the mortgage in-
terest, is the prospect of more certain adherence to the rule by the
parties. When a seller seeks to declare forfeiture of a contract, he will
generally seek an attorney to bring the ensuing quiet title action for
him, and if the rule is clear that the seller must search the records and
41. This was made clear in both Norlin (59 Wn. 2d at 272, 367 P.2d at 624) and
Kendrick (75 Wash. Dec. 2d at 475, 452 P.2d at 226).
42. See Kendrick v. Davis, 75 Wash. Dec. 2d at 483-84, 452 P.2d at 231 (Hill, 3.,
dissenting) and authorities there cited.
43. In fact, in Kendrick, the mortgagee had tendered the entire purchase price, plus
costs and attorney's fees of the seller, into court, seeking to do equity. 75 Wash. Dec. 2d
at 472, 452 P.2d at 224.
44. A more general view of the equities involved leads to the same conclusion. Where
a purchase money mortgage is taken by the seller, he must go through a complicated
statutory process to recover the land, while the seller under an installment contract can
summarily defeat the purchaser's interest because of a minor default, and the purchaser
is given no absolute right of redemption. The whole development of this harsh practice
has been severely criticized. 13 WESTERN RES. L. REv. 554 (1962); 35 BRooxLYN L.
REv. 83 (1968). In addition, the harshness of this rule of forfeiture has led many courts
to restrict the seller's rights wherever possible. Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 8, 12-13 (1953). The
Kendrick decision has the effect of expanding, rather than restricting, the seller's right
to summarily extinguish the rights of others, and thus runs counter to the general trend
which attempts to restrict these harsh results.
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notify mortgagees of the purchaser's equity, an attorney will be aware
of the notification requirement and fulfill it. In contrast, if the mort-
gagee must notify the seller of his interest before being entitled to
notice of intent to forfeit, the mortgagee's burden may not be so often
carried. Mortgagees, whether they should or not, may accept and
record their mortgages without legal advice. Thus, the mortgagee, if
burdened with a notification requirement, may lose his security interest
by relying on the commonly accepted notion that recording protects
him, at least to the extent of assuring him that he is entitled to be
notified of actions which might extinguish his interest.
A final reason for placing a burden of notification on the seller is
that the rule in Kendrick, which relieves him of notifying a mortgagee
when he lacks actual knowledge, places a premium on ignorance. The
seller without knowledge is protected, but the one who diligently in-
quires after the status of the property is charged with a burden of
notification.4 5
In conclusion, the Washington Supreme Court should not have de-
cided Kendrick v. Davis as it did. The decision would have been
narrower had the court seized upon analytical possibilities for dis-
tinguishing Norlin v. Montgomery rather than overruling it. But given
the result reached in Kendrick, the court properly overruled Norlin
because the two decisions are, in substance, conflicting. The crux of
the matter is that application of Norlin reasoning to the Kendrick fact
pattern would have produced a more satisfactory result. The construc-
tion and application of the recording statutes by the Kendrick court
was not dictated by the purposes of recording acts nor by the rationale
of the rule that antecedent parties do not have constructive notice of
what is subsequently recorded. The court should have decided that the
seller and the mortgagee each had constructive notice of the other's
interest. Then, reaching the equities of the case, the court should have
placed the burden of notification of the impending forfeiture on the
seller. This result would have conformed to the reasonable expectations
of the parties, provided for uniformity of future practice, enabled the
parties to fix notification obligations before choice of the method of
forfeiture, and provided for greater certainty of application-all of
which are lacking under the Kendrick decision.
45. See notes 17-18 and accompanying text supra.
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